In a notable display of bipartisanship, all 19 members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted on April 14 to approve a modified version of S. 615, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.

The original bill, co-sponsored by Sens. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) but opposed by the Obama administration, brought together senators from both parties who were skeptical of the ongoing negotiations between the U.S., its negotiating partners, and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program.  The bipartisan alliance demanded a greater role for Congress as international deliberations drew nearer to a June 30 deadline for a final deal.

The White House later accepted a revised bill reflecting a compromise worked out between Corker and Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.).  At risk of a Congressional override, the administration agreed to legislation that it says contains substantive changes, a notion that Corker disputes.  It seems that what has emerged from the haggling between the White House and the Senate is a mechanism that, once adopted by both houses, will give Congress a role whose parameters are still somewhat murky.

What does the measure allow Congress to do?
 
S. 615, which is expected to be signed into law in May, grants Congress a vote on whatever deal emerges from the final negotiations between the P5 + 1 negotiating partners (the U.S., France, Great Britain, Germany, China, and Russia) and Iran, set to conclude June 30.   The president cannot waive any sanctions within 30 days of submitting the agreement to Congress, or for another 12 days beyond that if Congress passes a resolution disapproving of the agreement.
 
What does the measure allow the president to do?
 
The president can veto any Congressional resolution disapproving of the deal, in which case he can lift sanctions within 52 days of his submitting the agreement to Congress—unless Congress passes the resolution with a veto-proof majority, meaning two thirds of both houses.
 
What else must the administration do?
 
The president is required to submit a final deal to Congress by July 9, or the review period is extended to 60 days.  The administration also must certify to Congress every 90 days that Iran is complying with its obligations under the agreement.
 
How did the Corker-Cardin compromise change the legislation?
 
The revised bill shortens the review period for the final agreement from 60 days to 30.  It also mitigates terms that would make the lifting of sanctions dependent on Iran ending its support of terrorism, although the regime’s terrorist activities and its ballistic missile program are among a range of issues outside the scope of the agreement on which the president would be required to report to Congress.  
 
Could the legislation undergo further change?
 
Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) withdrew plans to include an amendment that would make a final agreement with Iran dependent on the regime’s recognition of Israel, something the administration fears would scuttle the negotiations.  Rubio still has the option of introducing such an amendment on the Senate floor.  Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) might offer a floor amendment that would categorize the Iran deal as a treaty requiring a two-thirds Senate vote for ratification.  President Obama has indicated he would like no more changes to the bill.
 
What is the likely impact of S. 615?
 
The bill will give Congress greater involvement in the negotiations than it might otherwise have had.  It also gives the administration greater ability to assure its negotiating partners, as well as the Iranians, that it has the legal and political support it needs in Washington to implement a final deal.  Will the legislation torpedo an agreement with Iran?  Only if Congress can muster a two-thirds majority in both houses to override a presidential veto.  Without the bill, a skeptical Congress would not have had a vote on the final deal, although it still could have passed a law—subject to presidential veto—blocking the agreement’s implementation. 

Rachel Goldberg, Ph.D has been the B’nai B’rith International director of health and aging policy since 2003 and the deputy director of the B’nai B’rith International Senior Services since 2007. Before joining B'nai B'rith International, she taught politics and government at the University of Puget Sound and Georgetown University. To view some of her additional content, Click Here.

Among the first acts of the 114th U.S. Congress was the adoption of a new rule that will undercut Social Security as a whole, and risks steep cuts in Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (DI) by late 2016.

During the summer, the 2014 Social Security and Medicare Trustees Report stated the DI trust fund is at risk of being depleted by 2016. 

The latest forecast is consistent with past reports, including expectations in the early 1980s, when funding allocations between retirement and disability benefits were last adjusted.

The new rule would essentially prohibit a “clean reallocation” bill, and require any reallocation to be accompanied by proposals likely to cut benefits somewhere in the Social Security system. Proponents of the rule insist that is needed to protect the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund from moving funds to the “broken” DI system.

B’nai B’rith International urged Congress to increase the DI’s allocation from the payroll tax, funding that all Social Security programs share. 

Reallocating funds from the payroll tax has been a measure routinely carried out 11 times over the life of the program. B'nai B'rith International pushed for this reallocation to keep millions of disabled Americans, many of whom are also elderly, from experiencing benefit cuts of 20 percent in late 2016.

The disability system is not broken, and a reallocation is not only appropriate and routine, but also will not cause appreciable harm to retiree benefits. 

A reallocation of funds from the payroll tax to DI would actually put the fund on equal footing with OASI and other Social Security programs, making the benefits fully funded through 2033.