For more than four decades—since the disengagement of forces following the 1973 Yom Kippur War—the Syrian border was unquestionably the quietest of Israel's frontiers. Despite its periodic saber rattling, rejectionism, pan-Arabism and support for Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Assad dynasty—Hafez and then son Bashar—strived to keep Syria out of direct military confrontation with Israel—particularly after the trouncing of the Syrian air force during the 1982 First Lebanon War. Contrasted with the recurring rocket fire, snipings, kidnappings and outright wars that remain the norm along the Israel-Lebanese border—first with Palestinian terrorist organizations and then with Iran-back Hezbollah—the Israeli Golan was the epitome of pastoral tranquility, Israel's veritable Switzerland, with the Israel Defense Forces’s (IDF's) eavesdropping devices on the winter-snowcapped Hermon Mountain keeping watchful eye as far as Damascus and its environs. 
 
As 2016 commences, this long-enduring serenity is being threatened by Iranian intensions to take advantage of the presence of its proxy for foreign adventurism and terrorism—Hezbollah—in Syria to shore up Bashir Assad against Daesh (the Islamic State), to ignite the Israel-Syria border too. 
 
The Iranians are striving to use Hezbollah to bring about the collapse of the two main principals that have guided Israeli policy since the beginning of the civil war in Syria: 1) That it will not allow weapons that could tip the strategic balance in the area to be shipped into its fronts with Syria or Lebanon. To this end, Israel reportedly launched 10 air attacks between January 2013 and October 2015 against convoys in Syria and even as far as Somalia carrying weapons to Hezbollah; and 2) To prevent the Syrian Golan from becoming a zone for launching offensive operations against Israel, as is the Lebanese border already. This, ostensibly, was behind the elimination of the Lebanese Druze Hezbollah terrorist Samir Kuntar, reportedly by Israeli Air Force jets that attacked a building in Damascus from Israeli airspace on Dec. 15, killing Kuntar and eight others including Farhan Essam Shaalan, a senior commander in the Syrian anti-Israel resistance militia.
 
Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has vowed to avenge Kuntar's death, putting the IDF on high alert along the Lebanese border. Kuntar already had a record of terror, having kidnapped and murdered the policeman Eliyahu Shahar and the Haran family in 1979, which earned him notoriety as one of the most ruthless terrorists in Israel’s history. Since being released from an Israeli prison in 2008 in an exchange with Hezbollah for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers, Kuntar had been at the forefront of efforts to establish a Hezbollah clone in the Syrian Golan. Iran's attempt to ignite the Syria-Israel border will probably slowdown in Kuntar's absence, but experts expected that it will remain a strategic goal of the Iranian regime.
 
The limited scope of Israel’s offensive posture in Syria to weapons transfers and terror infrastructure directed against Israel, has led it to a hands-off policy regarding the much broader issue of the dissolution of the Syrian state and the ascendance of numerous other players, international, national and local, in the Syrian arena since the start of the civil war in March 2011. 
Speaking recently to Makor Rishon, Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad, the long-serving director of Policy and Political-Military at Israel's Ministry of Defense, reiterated this position in referring to the tragedy in Syria and its possible spill-over into the Golan Heights: "There is no such thing today as Syria. A human tragedy of major proportions is taking place there. Hundreds of thousands of dead, millions of refugees, fine cities with tremendous historical significance destroyed. Bashar Assad controls only a quarter of Syria and he is completely dependent on Iran and Hezbollah. At this juncture the only exit from the war is political, as was seen in the talks in Vienna. Some say that if Assad is out an arrangement could be found, but the truth is that there are not a lot of people jumping for the job of President of Syria. There are no quick resolutions, everything is complicated. Syrian is erupting lava, with partition on the horizon."
 
In a new paper entitled “Syria: New Map, New Actors Challenges and Opportunities for Israel” published (in Hebrew) this month by Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel, former head of Strategic Planning in the IDF’s General Staff and researchers Nir Boms and Ofir Winter argue that, considering the multitude of state and non-state actors (estimated at 1,500 groups of widely varying political leanings, according to a February 2014 estimate by James R. Clapper, U.S. director of National Intelligence), now vying for territory and power in what was once Syria, it is time for Israel to abandon this no-interference policy and to actively engage ‘positive’ local and foreign elements with which it has common interests.
 
These players impact on the current reality in Syria and are expected to play a significant role in the stabilization and redesign of the Syrian space if the Assad regime falls or if the current entity still known as Syria breaks up into Alawite, Kurdish, Druse and Sunni enclaves. The writers argue that Israel should consider adopting a more robust policy, in coordination and partnership with positive elements in the Syrian arena that will promote both its long and short term goals.

​As another year’s U.N. General Assembly’s General Debate session has recently wrapped up, B’nai B’rith has concluded our annual round of meetings with presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers at the sidelines of the UNGA session.

This week of meetings gives B’nai B’rith leadership access to world leaders and an opportunity to engage in advocacy on core issues of importance to B’nai B’rith, most critically: the safety and security of Israel and the Jewish people throughout the world, and our concerns about the Iranian nuclear deal and Iran’s continued support for terrorism.

For anyone who has served in the Israeli army or who has children in active service, the viral video from an August 28 altercation between a lone Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier and a swarm of Palestinian women and children pummeling, clawing and biting him in an eventually successful effort to free 12-year-old Muhammad Tamimi—who he intended to arrest for throwing stones at troops—was emotionally wrenching.
 
Having just arrived that morning back to a sweltering Israel after a holiday in pleasantly cool Norway and pastoral Scotland, the images of this soldier left on his own for long minutes by his comrades as he tries to shake off the assailants—aided by some foreign instigators—while he is filmed from every possible angle by multiple still and video cameramen—left me with a sinking feeling.
 
This leads one to ask what can be done to better protect soldiers caught in this situation, and what best practices can be employed to counter such Palestinian-initiated, staged clashes, while unfriendly cameras are whirring and snapping away in a game of gotcha employed by much of the media covering the territories.
 
Indeed the staged—and therefore predictable—nature of the incident was recognized even by the Daily Mail and the Telegraph, two British newspapers that are quick to tar and feather Israel at every turn, usually without looking back, that were forced to change their initial critical headlines and even to remove the report entirely from their web site when it became clear that the soldiers' assailants are known provocateurs, particularly his teenage sister Ahed and their radical parents.
 
Some Israeli commentators such as Nachum Barnea in Yedioth/YNet used the incident to bemoan again the debilitating impact the "occupation" is having on the State of Israel and its young soldiers; others see an entirely different message in the images—that the fearlessness with which Palestinian women and children accost an Israeli soldier armed with an assault rifle proves that they know full well that even when being hit,  wrestled to the ground and nearly disarmed, he will not use his weapon, debunking claims of widespread brutality.

A look at longer YouTube posts of the incident tells a more nuanced story, still undoubtedly partial and skewered: Nebi Salah, where the encounter took place, has been a focus of violent Palestinian demonstrations for a number of years. Fridays are their favorite days for instigators to drum up a few women and children, perhaps with the promise of monetary remuneration, to march down the short access road out of the village toward a spring over which the village and a nearby Jewish settlement, Halamish, have been feuding for years.
 
The video shows a handful of Palestinian young men using the children and women as cover as they target IDF troops in the distance using potentially injurious high-velocity slings. The troops respond with tear gas as the Palestinians use their slings also to throw the canisters back at the troops.
 
Eventually, the troops advance uphill on the group when the 12-year old is caught by the soldier. These are scenes that have repeated themselves almost every Friday (I was witness to one about three years ago), which have raised renewed calls to train and deploy for just these kinds of situations.

Seemingly lost in the debate over the Iran nuclear deal is any focus at all on that country’s horrendous human rights record. In choosing to negotiate only on the nuclear program, the P5+1 (the United States plus China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and Germany) lost an opportunity to exert leverage on Tehran’s serial human rights abuses, as well as its support for terrorist organizations like Hezbollah.

It was only in 2011 that the UN Human Rights Council approved the appointment of a special rapporteur on Iran, Ahmed Shaheed, a respected diplomat from the Maldives. From the Iranian regime’s takeover in 1979, it has been a serial abuser of human rights: of political opponents, women, the LGBT community, journalists, adherents of the Baha’i religion and others. It has done so with impunity, unmoved by international exposure of its brazen abridgment of basic freedoms.

This month in Geneva, the Human Rights Council will open one of its thrice-yearly six-week sessions. With the signing of the nuclear deal and the UN Security Council’s endorsement of the agreement, the rehabilitation of Iran in international forums has begun. A number of European states have already embarked on a headlong rush to do business there. Notwithstanding remaining sanctions (for five years) on the acquisition of advanced conventional weapons, it is believed Tehran already is anticipating an armaments buying spree. And Iran will surely bolster its backing (and direction) of Hezbollah and other terrorist proxies.

The forthcoming session at the Human Rights Council should give us a good indication of whether or not Iran will get a pass on its human rights record. Already, some diplomats are reported to have urged “giving Iran some space” on the issue, now that it has agreed to the nuclear deal. That would be bad news for Shaheed, whose 2014 report on human rights in Iran runs 81 pages.

His report, which includes a detailed annex of individual cases, makes for a powerful charge sheet. He notes that there were 753 individuals executed in Iran in 2014, the highest number in 12 years. They included 25 women, and there were 53 public executions. This, while the Tehran regime was negotiating the nuclear deal with the P5+1 powers.

Absurdity is the rule: Shaheed cites the case of a death sentence pronounced on Mohamed Ali Yehari, an expert in alternative medical theories, for “corruption on earth.”

He was originally sentenced to five years for “committing blasphemy.”

Under the category "reprisals against individuals for contact with human rights organizations and U.N. human rights mechanisms," 15 persons were prosecuted or “faced intimidation.”

​The report covers countless examples of arbitrary detention of journalists, lawyers and student activists. Four leaders of the failed 2009 Green Revolution remain under house arrest. Shaheed cites the cases of 30 journalists who were detained on charges of “national security crimes” and “propaganda against the system” and “spreading falsehoods.” Five privately-owned religious TV stations were closed down for “working illegally for satellite TV stations in the United States and Great Britain.”

Last November, 24 Kurdish prisoners went on hunger strikes to protest inadequate medical treatment; they had been arrested on “national security” charges for commemorating International Mother Tongue Language Day. From the outset, followers of the Baha’i faith have been a special focus of social stigmatization. The report notes that 135 Baha’i remain jailed for their religious beliefs. Last year, a Baha’i cemetery was desecrated; to date, no perpetrators have been apprehended. Burials of Baha’is have been delayed or proscribed.

Christians have often been a target in Iran. On Christmas Day last year, nine persons were arrested for celebrating the holiday in the town of Rudehen.

In response to complaints of discrimination against the gay community, the Shaheed report notes that “the government responded by stating its total rejection of homosexual behaviors.”

Violence against women and juvenile offenders is a staple of the human rights abuse catalog: Shaheed cites nearly hundreds of acid attacks on women, many of them for wearing “improper clothing.” No arrests in these cases were reported.

Even with this shameless and pervasive record of rights abuse, one would have thought that Tehran would have released the four Americans it is holding (Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian; Saeed Abedini, a Christian pastor from Idaho; Amir Hekmati, a dual citizen and Marine Corps veteran; and Robert Levinson, a US government contractor). The temerity of the Iranian rulers seemingly knows no bounds. Not to have made their release a condition for agreeing to the nuclear deal is one of the major criticisms of its opponents.

Addressing Iranian human rights abuses must be made a visible priority by the P5+1 and others in the community of democracies. Placing Ahmed Shaheed’s reports in the circular file and not acting more forcefully to isolate Iran on these issues will only embolden a regime already brimming with hubris over the nuclear deal.

"Giving Iran some space" is surely the wrong approach.

"Let's not mince words,” President Obama told an audience at American University on August 5, in defense of the Iran nuclear agreement.  “The choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy or some form of war. Maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon."

The following day, Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) took issue with the dichotomy offered by the president.  “Some say the only answer to this is war.  I don’t believe so,” Schumer said.  “I believe we should go back and try to get a better deal…The nations of the world should join us in that.”

This disagreement between two senior officials of the same party raises two crucial questions for both Democratic and Republican members of Congress to ponder as they decide how to vote on the Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA) when Congress passes judgment next month.  Is there really no alternative to the deal other than war?  And do opponents of the agreement actually advocate war?

The answer to the second question is almost universally no.  Many of the deal’s fiercest critics, such as Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) have called not for war, but for a better agreement.  So why would the JCPOA’s supporters imply that their opponents prefer war as a policy option?

Framing the issue as a diplomacy-vs.-war dilemma helps the deal’s backers channel unhappy memories of the debate that preceded the U.S. operation in Iraq 12 years ago.  We chose to enter a costly war once before, the reasoning goes; let’s not repeat that mistake.  Invoking the specter of war also minimizes the arguments of those who oppose the JCPOA on the merits; it is easier to quell serious debate if critics can simply be dismissed as warmongers.

But regardless of how one felt about the prospect of military conflict in 2003 or 2015, it seems clear that other options remain available with respect to Iran today.   Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey acknowledged as much in his recent testimony before the Senate.  “I can tell you that we have a range of options and I always present them” to the president, he told the Senate panel.

Increased sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and the credible threat of military force could go a long way toward securing a better agreement than the one currently being deliberated over.  With sanctions still in place – or tightened – Iran would have a strong incentive to slow its march toward nuclear weapons if the contracts with multinational energy firms Iran hopes to negotiate are suddenly put at risk.  Also in peril would be Iran’s access to the more than $100 billion in frozen assets it hopes to retrieve.

DIME, the military and government acronym for soft power tools, accounts for the diplomatic, informational, military and economic aspects of American power.  All of these instruments could be applied to maintain pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear program while the U.S. and its partners seek a better agreement.

The U.S. has significant leverage against Iran, a fact that was reflected during the negotiations by Iran’s continued insistence on the immediate lifting of sanctions to ease the country’s troubled economic plight.  If, as National Security Advisor Susan Rice said earlier this year, “A bad deal is worse than no deal,” how did we arrive at a stark choice between this flawed agreement and war?

Certainly the debate over the JCPOA needs to be informed by a clear understanding of America’s options and how best to maximize them in order to prevent a nuclear Iran.  In that light, false dichotomies such as diplomacy vs. war are unhelpful distractions.

Iran—which publicly and proudly declares its intent to wipe Israel off the map—has been a major contributor to building the financial and military capacity of Hezbollah. It is directly responsible for developing the infrastructure of terror in Central and South America in order to, among other goals, have a base from which to attack the United States. 

Iran has been clearly implicated in the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the AMIA bombing two years later of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people.  Alberto Nisman, the Argentine prosecutor charged with investigating the AMIA bombing, was found dead in his home earlier this year after presenting an avalanche of evidence about Iran's terrorist activities throughout the region. Most recently, he accused Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, her foreign minister and other members and allies of the government of having obstructed the investigation of Iranian involvement in the attack in order to secure an oil deal with Iran.

In fact, just a few months ago, an Iranian diplomat based in Uruguay hurriedly left the country after rumors that he was involved in suspicious activities, purportedly involving a plan to bomb the Embassy of Israel in Montevideo. 

Venezuela has proven the linchpin of this Iranian activity, with the country providing passports to members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and with ties including a direct air link, Iranian investments in “auto, bicycle, and cement” factories, and joint petroleum and mining ventures. Reports of military cooperation abound. Iran has steadily infiltrated Latin America in this manner, creating strong and dangerous ties with countries in the Chavez-Castro alliance (the Bolivarian Alternative for our Americas, or ALBA) including Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba and Ecuador, where Iran has signed dozens of economic agreements.

These avenues of influence are described by security analyst Joseph Humire as Iran’s pattern of penetration, evolving through its cultural, diplomatic, economic and military influence. It is clear that Iran maintains Latin America as a strategic priority for its global positioning.

It is in the context of all this manipulation that the United States, as a member of the P5+1, held negotiations and signed a deal with Iran with the intention of curbing its nuclear capabilities in exchange for sanctions relief. The Iran nuclear deal has been evaluated at length, and has been heavily criticized from broad reaches of the political spectrum. 

It is odd, then, that through all the debate and discussion, there still remains the question that everyone has seemingly failed to ask: what will be the impact of the Iran nuclear deal in our own backyard? One has to ask what effect sanctions relief will have on Iranian financial and material assistance to Hezbollah and other regional proxies throughout the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. 

The economic sanctions that at least strained Iranian endeavors over the past three decades will be lifted.  There is no doubt that the half-trillion dollar jackpot Iran is slated to receive will be directly funneled into those activities we dread most: the exportation of Iranian aggression and anti-Semitism. These funds, returned to the coffers of a known state sponsor of terrorism, will surely make their way toward financial and material assistance to Hezbollah and other regional proxies. As it concerns U.S. national security, one can’t help but flatly reject the far-reaching concessions of the P5+1 as a direct threat to our interests regionally, let alone globally.

The reaction in Latin America has, thus far, been as one might expect.  Kirchner has praised the agreement, while questioning local critics of the AMIA memorandum pact, surely a failed attempted to bless her own deal with Iran in the face of mounting pressure. The president of Colombia also congratulated President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry for their “courage” in securing the deal, perhaps related to Colombia’s close relationship with the United States.

But with history as our guide, this agreement will do more harm than good. The expanded presence of Iran in Latin American should have, at the outset, given the United States pause, given a known regime in Tehran that supports terrorism as an officially sanctioned tool of national power. That Iran remains heavily invested in the region’s shift to the left and the anti-U.S. sentiment it provokes is hardly surprising. The fact that regional powers do not recognize the danger within their own borders is naïve at best, ignorant at worst.

While a nuclear Iran would trigger proliferation and instability throughout the Middle East and beyond, the easing of sanctions will be found to provide an umbrella for Iran’s terror proxies around the globe. There has been no accountability for Iran’s decades-long history of deception and denial over their nuclear ambitions and past links to terrorism, and there is no reason to give Iran the benefit of the doubt now.

For at least a decade, when asked during meetings with government representatives about priority concerns, I have typically listed them as: “Iran, Iran and… Iran.”

No one country is, to be sure, the be-all and end-all of the world’s problems, or the Middle East’s. But Iran – by far the strongest and most vociferous state adversary of Israel – is the patron of most of the non-state forces committed to terrorizing Israel’s people. In fact, both its clerical leadership and its proxies are doctrinally committed to preventing peace with the Jewish state – and to that lone regional democracy’s very destruction.


However, the deadly menace posed by Iran far surpasses even this. The United States, whose own “death” Iranian regime-incited crowds continued to urge even during the recent diplomatic engagement, has long recognized Iran as the leading state sponsor of global terrorism, with casualties spanning from Argentina to Bulgaria. Of late, much alarm has rightly been raised over the horrors of the so-called Islamic State (a Sunni group), but too many have become indifferent to the horrors, domestic and otherwise, of the (Shi’ite) Islamic Republic. In addition to the notorious Quds Force of the regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a key, fragile Mediterranean country, Lebanon, is politically dominated by Iran-sponsored Hezbollah – the foremost military power at home, long the “A-team of terrorists” on the international scene, and the defender of last resort of its allied Assad regime in Syria, whose civil strife has seen far more Arabs killed in only four years than have been in at least 70 years of the conflict involving Israel. Indeed, in virtually every site of severe violence and turmoil in the region, from Iraq to Yemen – where dramatically emboldened Houthi rebels now openly hawk their mantra of “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Damnation to the Jews, Victory to Islam” – Iranian fingerprints are to be not-so-subtly found.

Little wonder, then, that for all the chatter in Washington about Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s “hard-line” demands and anxieties on Iran, those same sentiments are matched, at the very least, by virtually all of America’s Arab partners as well – those who know Iran best and must live with it as next-door neighbors. Notably, no action and no capacity on the part of Israel, and no sharp political differences that they have had with it, has ever so alarmed the Arab states as a potentially nuclear-armed Iran has. Presaging a nuclear arms race in a region that can least afford it, and during an American presidency that had aimed for global nuclear non-proliferation, those Arab states have pledged to match any military capacity that the Iranians acquire.

Little wonder, then, that Israelis across party lines – already facing the most brutally inhospitable of neighborhoods – have been so extraordinarily adamant that the most dangerous of governments not have any capability to obtain the most dangerous of weaponry.

And “capability,” to be certain, is what is key; the watering down of fundamental benchmarks for a nuclear agreement with Iran – from “no nuclear-weapons capability” to “no nuclear weapons” – was a significant, early blunder by international negotiators. Those negotiators have now managed to reach a hard-won deal with Iran – notwithstanding unceasing public animosity, and relentless re-interpretation of mutual understandings, on the part of supreme Iranian authorities – and that deal may buy some short-term benefits. The question is, do temporary benefits outweigh lasting hazards and damage? Fully assessing the agreement’s benefits and drawbacks may be possible only over the course of months, if not years.

Filling a vacuum of uncertainly, the Iran deal could wrest transient Iranian restraint in its nuclear activities for the first time in years, and at a time when world powers, facing an Iran whose nuclear program is now extensive, have either been complicit in or unsure about how to contend with that advancing program. But, by virtually all accounts, Iran has been allowed to remain a nuclear-threshold state, with much of its nuclear infrastructure (and some of its nuclear research and development work) remaining intact. As critically, after only ten or fifteen years of the agreement’s duration, Iran would be significantly freed to race for a nuclear bomb – with world powers left in the same position of determining how, if at all, they might obstruct this unprecedented disaster for international peace and security. Meanwhile, the economic sanctions that at least strained Iranian mischief-making endeavors and prompted the Iranians to negotiate will have been lifted (with just limited possibility of effective restoration). Iranian pursuit of conventional but ever-more-lethal arms will also have progressed unabated – indeed now likely escalated, with foreign acquiescence – and Iran’s de facto status as a nuclear player will have been conceded to by its heavyweight interlocutors.

Even without these factors, cynics – or, as they might prefer, realists – have good reason to fear that the landmark agreement with Iran will not yield responsible Iranian policies or movement toward regional stability. A much-heralded political agreement, and international inspections, utterly failed to stop even singularly isolated North Korea from becoming a regime possessing nuclear weapons. And we know one thing about Iran: notwithstanding its supreme leaders’ express disavowal, in religious terms, of obtaining nuclear arms, Iran has practiced incessant duplicity and subterfuge in its stunningly aggressive pursuit of nuclear capabilities – a pursuit that the world’s most well-informed intelligence agencies unmistakably recognize as consistent with a hunt for access to the most dangerous weapons in existence. The very ability to “break out” as a nuclear-armed state and state-sponsor of terrorists may, after all, be all that Iran needs to afford itself and its proxies relative impunity for their violent fanaticism – or a safeguard against any external notion of supporting Arab Spring-style uprising in Iran, like the abortive one of 2009. The very inability of the U.S. to prevent the unthinkable but long-anticipated would certainly prove a victory for the Islamic Republic – and an undermining of confidence in Washington’s preparedness to defend core interests and allies.

The hope of those endorsing the international nuclear agreement with Iran, beyond interest in again freeing up Iranian oil resources and business opportunities, may not rest on expectation of organic Iranian regime or policy change as much as a mix of trust in an active (if decidedly constrained) inspections protocol, optimism that valuable time will have been bought to detect and effectively disrupt any Iranian nuclear misdeeds, and suspicion that Iranian domestic political considerations (particularly demands for sanctions relief) will ultimately outweigh the temptations of a wild nuclear adventurism. But Iran’s nuclear campaign, despite all the outside pressures and scrutiny, has proven tellingly determined. The policy calculus of an ideologically radical theocracy like Iran, after all, may well differ from the mundane considerations of politicians in foreign capitals like London, Paris and Vienna. Moreover, with the mullahs’ many hard-earned foes, a nuclear “deterrent” may not take a back seat in Tehran to economic growth and rising employment rates as a perceived necessity for self-preservation and policy advancement. If Iran does reach a point of no return in its ability to acquire nuclear arms, the country might even eventually be able to have its cake and eat it too – enjoying near-hegemony in its neighborhood as well as economic strength, enabled by an international community hungry for oil and wary of war.

The war-wariness of Westerners and others is, of course, understandable, and the new deal with Iran does seem poised to make irrelevant the already tepid threat of a Western military response to Tehran’s nuclear activity. No doubt, a military confrontation with Iran – already such a destructive force on the international scene – would have been terribly costly. The only thing far more costly is the prospect of confrontation with an Iran whose illicit nuclear ambitions have been allowed to come to fruition.